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Abstract 
In the context of the systematic genotyping of UK Biobank’s participants and the piloting of 
non-invasive pre-natal testing within the screening pathway for Down syndrome, this paper 
considers the plausibility, basis, scope, and weight of the claim that participants and patients 
have a right to know as well as a right not to know the results of the genetic analysis 
undertaken. It also considers the possible relevance to these issues of the landmark decision 
of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. 
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1. Introduction 
New technologies in healthcare, like new technologies in other sectors, disrupt settled 
practices and provoke new questions.1 In the context of human genetics, one such question 
concerns the ‘right to know’ and the ‘right not to know’.2 This paper focuses on two recent 
developments—one, the systematic genotyping of UK Biobank’s participants and the other, 
                                                          
*  An earlier version of this paper was given under the title ‘Big Biobanks: A Case Study in Regulating 
Health Technologies’ at the 2015 Symposium of the Sheffield Health Law and Policy Research Centre, 
School of Law, University of Sheffield, on June 29, 2015. I am grateful to those who gave me feedback 
at the symposium as well as to those who have commented as the scope of the paper has broadened; 
but, of course, the usual disclaimers apply. I should emphasise, too, that the views expressed in this 
paper are purely personal and should not be taken to represent or reflect the views of either the Ethics 
and Governance Council of UK Biobank (which I chaired from 2011-2015) or the National Screening 
Committee (of which I am a member). 
 
1  See, e.g., M. Klang, Disruptive Technology (University of Gothenburg, 2006); and, for ample evidence 
of such disruption, both doctrinally and socially, see R. Brownsword, E. Scotford, and K. Yeung (eds), 
Oxford Handbook on Law, Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
 
2  As discussed, e.g., in the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues (London, 
1993); and R. Chadwick, M. Levitt, and D. Shickle (eds), The Right to Know and the Right Not to 
Know (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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the proposed piloting of non-invasive pre-natal testing (NIPT) within the screening pathway 
for Down syndrome3—that prompt further reflection on these claimed rights. 
Announcing the first of these developments, in June 2015, UK Biobank released genotyped 
data on 150,000 of its participants, with the data on the remaining 350,000 participants due to 
be released later this year. With more than 800,000 markers targeted and, for each participant, 
some 73 million imputed SNPs, UK Biobank is now able to make available to researchers 
detailed genetic data.4  What, though, is the significance of this development for 
participants? Because UK Biobank is able to link the data and samples to particular 
identifiable participants, there is no insuperable practical obstacle to returning to individual 
participants (i) their own genotyped details (for example, a participant, worried about 
possible  loss of cognitive function, might be interested in knowing whether he has the 
ApoE4 marker) or (ii) potentially clinically significant findings made by researchers—nor, 
equally, is there any insuperable practical obstacle to withholding such data or findings where 
it is known that the particular participant does not want feedback.  
Turning to the second development, the attraction of NIPT (which operates by analysing 
fragments of fetal DNA that circulate in the mother’s blood) is that it promises to reduce the 
need for an invasive amniocentesis test or chorionic villus sampling and, with that, to reduce 
the number of babies lost during pregnancies.5 However, because NIPT presents an 
                                                          
3  See J. Gallagher, ‘Safer Down’s test backed for NHS use’ (2016) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
35311578) (last accessed September 25, 2016). Forrnally, the NSC has recommended to the Minister 
that the test should be piloted; and, at the time of writing, a ministerial announcement on the matter is 
awaited. 
 
4  See, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/scientists-3/genetic-data/ ( last accessed September 25, 2016). 
 
5  For a successful trial led by Professor Lyn Chitty at Great Ormond Street Hospital, see 
http://www.rapid.nhs.uk/about-rapid/evaluation-study-nipt-for-down-syndrome (last accessed 
September 25, 2016). 
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opportunity to provide information about the fetus that goes beyond the trisomies,6 even to 
the point of full genomic profiling, as well as returning information about the mother,7 it 
exacerbates concerns about the ‘medicalisation’ of pregnancy, the ‘commodification’ of life, 
the ‘trivialisation’ of decisions about abortion, the ‘routinisation’ of prenatal testing, and the 
‘stigmatisation of disability’8, and so on. Inevitably, as NIPT is rolled out—and, with the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics having announced a new Working Party to consider the ethical 
issues raised by potential future uses of NIPT9—there will be questions about whether and 
what a pregnant woman has a right to know, or not to know.  
In response to these developments, regulators might strive to strike a reasonable ‘balance of 
interests’, designed to maximise the health-related benefits while, at the same time, 
minimising any possible harms to patients or research participants. Or, they might encourage 
clinicians and researchers to agree on a ‘responsible’ approach that is then articulated in 
professional codes of practice. However, if we believe that the regulatory environment should 
be built around ‘the right to know’ and ‘the right not to know’, implying (among other things) 
that it is for individual patients and participants, rather than communities of clinicians and 
                                                          
6  For example, Sequenom’s MaterniT 21 PLUS ‘can tell you if you are having a boy or a girl, and 
screens for both common and rare chromosomal abnormalities. The test screens for trisomy 21 (Down 
syndrome), trisomy 18 (Edwards syndrome), trisomy 13 (Patau syndrome), and many others that can 
affect your baby’s health’: see https://sequenom.com/tests/reproductive-health/maternit21-plus#patient-
overview (last accessed April 25, 2016). 
 
7  See, e.g., K. Oswald, ‘Prenatal blood test detects cancer in mothers-to-be’, Bionews 739 (2015) at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_503998.asp. (last accessed September 25, 2016). 
 
8  See, e.g., the exchange at Prime Minister’s Questions on May 4, 2016: see 
http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/abortion/prime-minister-questioned-on-screening-out-
people-with-downs-syndrome (last accessed September 25, 2016). And, ‘Sally Phillips explores the 
impact of a new screening [test] for Down’s Syndrome in BBC Two’s A World Without Down’s 
Syndrome?’ at http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2016/world-without-downs-syndrome 
(last accessed October 15, 2016). 
 
9  See, http://nuffieldbioethics.org/news/2016/new-project-on-non-invasive-prenatal-testing/ (last 
accessed April 19, 2016). For a very helpful background paper, see Vardit Ravitsky, ‘Non-Invasive 
Prenatal Testing (NIPT): Identifying Key Clinical, Ethical, Social, Legal and Policy Issues’: available 
at http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/NIPT-background-paper-8-Nov-2015-FINAL.pdf 
(last accessed April 27, 2016)..  
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researchers, to decide whether and, if so, which results and findings are returned to them, 
such responses will seem inappropriate.  
The paper is in three principal parts. In the first part, the general plausibility of a claimed 
right to know and right not to know is considered; in the second, with a view to developing 
an improved understanding of these rights, a number of responses and counter-responses to 
patients or participants who advance such claims are explored; and, in the third, the possible 
relevance to these issues of the landmark decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery 
v Lanarkshire Health Board10—a decision that arguably supports both claimed rights—is 
assessed. 
2. The plausibility of a claimed right to know and right not to know  
On the face of it, the proposition that there is a general ‘right to know’ as well as a ‘right not 
to know’ seems both vague and implausible. By whom, and against whom, are these rights 
claimed? What kind of information is covered by these rights? Simply because there is 
something that I would like to know (for example, the secret of a particular conjuring trick or 
the recipe for Coca-Cola), it surely does not follow that I have a claim-right against those 
who have the information in question that they should disclose it. After all, the whole point of 
recognising a right to informational privacy and confidentiality (including trade secrets) is to 
deny that there is a general right to know. On the other hand, there are some particular 
contexts and some particular circumstances in which the claimed right to know is plausible. 
For example, it seems reasonable that insurers should expect their prospective insured to 
disclose facts that are material to the risk to be covered (but not perhaps the results of genetic 
tests), that employers should expect prospective employees to disclose their employment 
history, that finance companies should expect those who apply for credit to disclose their 
                                                          
10  [2015] UKSC 11. 
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financial circumstances, and so on. It might also seem reasonable to expect others to make 
the equivalent of an easy rescue by passing on potentially life-saving information. Indeed, 
precisely such an analogy has been advanced to question whether biobanks would be justified 
either in adopting ‘no feedback’ protocols or sticking to such a protocol where they have 
potentially life-saving information that relates to a particular identifiable participant.11  
For the purposes of this paper, the fact that the context for the claimed rights is, broadly 
speaking, medical, might strike us as less important than the fact that A is making claims in 
relation to information that is ‘about A’, that is ‘personal’ to A. Some might accept, without 
more, that A has a perfectly reasonable expectation that B should disclose, or refrain from 
disclosing, this information—information, after all, that is about A—if this is what A wants. 
If so, then, where a participant or a patient wishes to know about their genotyped data or their 
(or their baby’s) genetic profile, they will have the right to know; and, if they do not wish to 
have this information, they can assert their right not to know.  
However, it might be argued that, while it is necessary that the information is about A, this is 
not sufficient. It should not be forgotten that, if A has the claimed rights, A’s control over the 
information in question is privileged; armed with these rights, A may demand to know or not 
to know regardless of how any ‘balance of interests’ stands.  Some might argue, therefore, 
that the rights at issue are only plausible and sufficiently specific where they relate to 
information that not only concerns A but that also relates to A’s vital interests, such as A’s 
physical and psychological well-being. On this basis, it might be proposed that (i) where B 
                                                          
11  See, e.g., C. Heeney and M. Parker, ‘Ethics and the Governance of Biobanks’ in J. Kaye, S.M.C. 
Gibbons, C. Heeney, M. Parker and A. Smart, Governing Biobanks (Oxford: Hart, 2012) 282, at 296, 
where the authors remark that a no feedback approach has fallen out of favour in those cases where 
research might ‘produce very clear evidence of a serious harm which might be avoided by an easily 
available intervention and where there exists something akin to a duty of easy rescue.’; and D. 
Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, ‘Research Participants and the Right to be Informed’, in P. R. Ferguson 
and G. T. Laurie (eds), Inspiring a Medico-Legal Revolution (Essays in Honour of Sheila McLean). 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2015) 173. 
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has information that is about A (ii) that A does not also have, and (iii) where that information 
relates to A’s physical or psychological well-being, then (iv) if A wishes to have that 
information, B has a duty to disclose it to A (reflecting A’s claimed ‘right to know’), and (v) 
if A does not wish to have that information, B has a duty not to disclose it to A (reflecting 
A’s claimed ‘right not to know’). Hence, if the findings following the use of NIPT or genetic 
analysis (by a biobank or researchers who access the resource) are about A and relate to A’s 
physical or psychological well-being, then A has the claimed rights in relation to B (who has 
the information in question). 
To be sure, these remarks invite a number of questions—for example, whether, in the case of 
NIPT, information about A’s unborn baby should be treated as information about A, the 
mother12—and there is more work to do in grounding and refining the claimed rights so 
articulated. Nevertheless, as expressed, the rights surely satisfy a test of initial plausibility. 
3. Responding to A’s claimed rights 
Let us suppose that, in our focal cases, A claims a right to know, or not to know, against B 
(whether a screener, biobank manager or curator, or researcher). In each case, B might 
contest A’s claim and might do so in more than one way. For example, B might argue: 
• Screening and research contexts are rights-free zones.  
• Some rights are recognised but not either of the rights claimed by A.  
• The claimed rights are recognised but, because A has consented to the terms and 
conditions of screening and research participation which exclude those rights, A has 
no claim. 
• The claimed rights are recognised but they are not engaged because the information in 
question falls outside the scope of the rights. 
                                                          
12  For a response to this question, see the text at 3.4 below. 
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• The claimed rights are overridden by conflicting rights (or by compelling 
considerations of the ‘public interest’). 
We can say a few words about each of these responses and sketch how, in turn, A might 
reply.  
3.1 Screening and research contexts are rights-free zones 
To assert that health care in general, or more particularly public screening programmes and 
biobank research, are rights-free zones is not to suggest that screeners and researchers have 
no ethical commitments; it is simply to deny that ‘respecting the rights of others’ is the 
relevant test of doing the right thing. Rather, the justification for proposed public health 
interventions or practices is that they promise to promote the general utility; in clinical 
settings, medical professionals strive to avoid doing any harm as well as trying to do some 
good for patients; and, similarly, researchers are guided by their ethical responsibility to act 
in a way that will advance their knowledge and understanding of disease, diagnostic tests, and 
effective therapies while returning findings only if they will be of net benefit to participants. 
In reply, A might take a high road or a low road. The high road involves showing that a 
rights-based ethic has better theoretical credentials than any of its rivals (whether utilitarian 
or duty-based). For example, A might argue that, because ethicists assume that humans have 
the capacity for agency (indeed, moral agency), and because the logic of agency compels us 
to recognise that certain generic conditions are conducive to our agency (whatever our 
particular purposes or projects), then agents must regard themselves as having claim rights 
against one another with regard to the protection, preservation, and promotion of the ‘agency 
commons’.13  
                                                          
13  Seminally, see A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); and D. 
Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
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Alternatively, taking a lower road, A might argue that the recognition of rights is already 
implicit in public screening and biobanking practice. Quite apart from any particular 
statements made about the legitimate interests of those who are screened or who are research 
participants, where practice is to ‘invite’ individuals to be screened and to seek ‘volunteers’ 
to participate in research, the clear implication is that acceptance is optional. It certainly 
follows that taking part in screening or research is not required; and, should attempts be made 
to coerce individuals to participate, this would seem to infringe their prior claim-right not to 
be compelled to be screened or to participate in research projects. In other words, if the 
default position in relation to current practice is that individuals have a right not to be 
conscripted, then this undermines any claim that we are in a rights-free zone. 
3.2 The particular rights are not recognised 
Even if it is conceded that patients and participants do have some rights, it might be objected 
that the claimed rights are simply not recognised. Witness, in particular, the practice of 
biobanking where, subject to one or two exceptions (strikingly so in the terms and conditions 
for participation in the Estonian Genome Project14), the general rule is that participants are 
not granted either a right to know or a right not to know.15  To be sure, the Estonian position 
is in line with Article 10.2 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (according 
to which ‘Everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Compare, R. Brownsword, ‘Friends, Romans, and Countrymen: Is There a Universal Right to 
Identity?’ (2009) 1 Law Innovation and Technology 223. And, for a recent evaluation and application 
of the Gewirthian argument, as elaborated by Beyleveld, see the various contributions in P. Capps and 
S.D Pattinson (eds), Ethical Rationalism and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2017). 
 
14  See, http://www.geenivaramu.ee/for-donors/gene-donor-consent-form.html (last accessed December 1, 
2013). 
 
15  See, e.g., the survey in Ethics and Governance Council of UK Biobank, Feedback of Health Related 
Findings: Foreground Principles and Background Perspectives (London, 2015).  
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However, the wishes of individuals not to be so informed shall be observed’)16 as well as 
Article 5(c) of the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome (which endorses the ‘right 
of every individual to decide whether or not to be informed of the results of genetic 
examination and the resulting consequences’). However, the United Kingdom has not signed 
up to the former Convention (although, admittedly, not because of its position on the rights at 
issue); and the latter Declaration, while not to be ignored, is largely symbolic and aspirational 
and, arguably, something of an ethical cocktail, mixing liberal rights with rather conservative 
dignitarian ideas.17 So, we cannot summarily dismiss the assertion that the claimed rights are 
not actually recognised in the United Kingdom.  
If this suffices to place the burden of justification on A, it will be for A to show that, where 
NIPT is used or when in the course of the analysis of biobank genetic data, findings are made 
that potentially concern A’s physical or psychological well-being, A has a ‘reasonable 
expectation’ that the findings should be returned or not returned (in line with A’s will). By 
reference to which criterion, though, is A to show that this expectation is a reasonable one? 
First, A might invoke the common law. Thus far, at any rate in English law, the question of 
whether A might succeed in a tort claim were screeners who use NIPT to decline to return 
findings that A wished to have (or if they were to return findings contrary to A’s known wish 
not to have feedback) has barely surfaced. By contrast, there has been much discussion of 
whether a participant might succeed against a biobank researcher in a tort claim for wrongful 
                                                          
16  See, too, Article 17.3 of Recommendation CM/Rec (2016) 6 (on research on biological materials of 
human origin) for the right not be informed. 
 
17  For the latter, see e.g., Article 4 (no financial gain to be made from the human genome in its natural 
state) and Article 11 (prohibiting practices, such as human reproductive cloning, that are contrary to 
human dignity). Generally, see D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and 
Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); R. Brownsword, ‘Bioethics Today, Bioethics 
Tomorrow: Stem Cell Research and the “Dignitarian Alliance”’(2003) 17 University of Notre Dame 
Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 15, ‘Stem Cells and Cloning: Where the Regulatory 
Consensus Fails’ (2005) 39 New England Law Review 535, and ‘Human Dignity from a Legal 
Perspective’ in M. Duwell, J. Braavig, R. Brownsword, and D. Mieth (eds), Cambridge Handbook of 
Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 1. 
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non-disclosure of relevant individual findings.18 The consensus is that English law does not 
clearly support such a claim; and, if the legal test turns on whether it is ‘fair, just, and 
reasonable’ to place researchers under a feedback responsibility, this seems merely to restate 
the original question of whether the claimant’s expectation is a reasonable one. Whether or 
not the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board might 
impact on this is a matter to which we will return in the third part of the paper. 
Secondly, A might claim that the researchers or screeners had formally or informally 
signalled that feedback would be given. Given that the anticipated benefits of NIPT depend 
upon the results of the test being returned, it is unlikely that screeners will provoke claims 
based on a right to know—at any rate, not in relation to the primary results of the test. By 
contrast, many biobanks have well-advertised ‘no feedback’ policies, suggesting that A has 
no reasonable expectation of being informed. Even though such policies might be expressed 
ambiguously in terms that leave it unclear whether the biobank regards itself as having a duty 
not to return findings or as having no duty to return findings (thereby retaining a discretion to 
return findings), it is clear that ‘no feedback’ amounts to a denial of participants having a 
claim-right to know. 
Thirdly, in the context of biobanking, A might plead an expectation, shared by others, that 
because participants assist researchers in various ways, the latter should reciprocate by giving 
appropriate feedback.19 However, the fact that others share A’s expectation does not make 
anyone’s expectation reasonable. Possibly, the claim for reciprocity might be grounded in 
                                                          
18  Seminally, see C. Johnston and J. Kaye, ‘Does the UK Biobank have a Legal Obligation to Feedback 
Individual Findings to Participants?’ (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 239. 
 
19  For evidence of such an expectation, see, e.g., J. Bovenberg, T. Meulenkamp, E. Smets, and S. Gevers, 
‘Always expect the unexpected: Legal and social aspects of reporting Biobank research results to 
individual research participants’ (Nijmegen: Radboud University, Centre for Society and Genomics, 
2009); and Wellcome Trust and Medical Research Council, Assessing Public Attitudes to Health 
Related Findings in Research (London, 2012). 
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some other way—for example, by drawing on the relationship of ‘entrustment’ between 
participants and researchers20; but it is not enough that the de facto expectation is widely held 
by participants. 
Fourthly, A might rely on settled custom and practice, whether with regard to the use of NIPT 
or in biobanking. Even if the screeners or researchers with whom A deals have not explicitly 
declared their position in relation to the return of findings, general custom and practice might 
suffice to ground A’s reasonable expectation that the claimed rights are recognised. 
More ambitiously, A might argue that, irrespective of such contingent indicators, the claimed 
rights are immanent within our understanding of such key concepts as property, privacy, 
autonomy and agency (and our understanding of their associated rights). The anchor for such 
an argument lies in each agent’s critical interest in the free construction of his or her 
personality (or identity)—that is to say, each agent being free to be who they want to be, to 
form the relationships that they want to have, and to pursue the interests that they choose to 
have, and so on.21 Such a critical interest includes an interest in informational self-
determination that bridges both well-being and autonomy. In an age of burgeoning genetic 
information, some agents, preferring to be aware of risks and to manage them, will want to 
know as much as they can about the details of their genetic profile; but others will prefer not 
to anticipate their futures and to cross whatever bridges have to be crossed as and when they 
meet them—23andMe will not be for them. While the former will claim a right to know, the 
latter will insist on a right not to know. However, both rights are grounded in the root 
interests of human agents and, if denied, there is a diminution in both agent autonomy and 
                                                          
20  For such an argument, see H.S. Richardson, Moral Entanglements: The Ancillary-Care Obligations of 
Medical Researchers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
 
21  Compare Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2015) at 80, where privacy is defined as a right to be free from ‘unreasonable constraints on the 
construction of one’s own identity’. 
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agent well-being. If A wants to argue for the essential connectedness of the two claimed 
rights, this is perhaps the way to do it.22 
Focusing on the right to know, A might try to strengthen the claim by joining the debates 
about the recognition and allocation of proprietary rights in relation to both donated samples 
and personal data.23 Even if these debates are not yet resolved in A’s favour, it is arguable 
that, because property rights are ‘preclusionary’24 (in the sense that ‘if x is mine, then I need 
say no more to justify the decisions, even apparently unreasonable decisions, that I make 
about access to x’—implying that we should recognise proprietary rights only over important 
objects), there is a strong case for treating information relating to an agent’s own physical and 
psychological well-being as the object of a property right. If such information is then so 
treated, A surely has a better claim than any other agent to be the relevant rights-holder. If A 
can simply say in relation to such information ‘This is my property; it is mine’, this readily 
explains and justifies A’s demand to have findings returned; and, although it might require a 
bit more work, it might also explain and justify A’s insistence on not having feedback.   
                                                          
22  Compare the analyses in C.M. Halliburton, ‘How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom 
and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm’ (2009) 42 Akron Law Review 803; and J. 
Husted, ‘Autonomy and a Right Not to Know’, in Chadwick R. et al (n 2) 24. Compare, too, the 
approach to ‘best interests’ in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] 
UKSC 67 (where the significance of a particular patient’s attitude to matters of life and death is 
emphasised). 
23  See, e.g, the comprehensive survey of the law in relation to detached body parts in R. Hardcastle, Law 
and the Human Body: Property Rights, Ownership and Control (Oxford: Hart, 2007) and the positions 
taken in, e.g., R. Brownsword, ‘Property in Human Tissue: Triangulating the Issue’, in M. Steinman, P. 
Sykora, and U. Wiesing (eds), Altruism Reconsidered: Exploring New Approaches to Property in 
Human Tissue (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), 93; and Sarah Devaney, ‘Tissue Providers for Stem Cell 
Research: the Dispossessed’ (2010) 2 Law, Innovation and Technology 165. For the proprietary 
argument in relation to personal data, see, e.g., J. Lanier, Who Owns the Future? (London: Allen Lane, 
2013); and N.Purtova, ‘The Illusion of Personal Data as No One’s Property’ (2015) 7 Law, Innovation 
and Technology 83. 
 
24  As argued in D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) Ch. 7. 
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A might also plead the protean concept of privacy in support of the claimed rights.25 For 
example, if we treat privacy as a right to maintain a state of psychological separateness, or a 
right not to be subject to unwilled ‘intrusions’, or as a right to be let alone, any one of these 
versions seems to support the idea that A has a right not to know in relation to information 
that is personal to him or herself.26 Alternatively, if we treat privacy as an asset that we can 
deploy in developing our relationships with others,27 and particularly if we limit what is 
private to a particular class of sensitive personal information, this seems to support the idea 
that A has a right to know in relation to findings that are sensitive in this way. 
Whatever we make of these several arguments, there is more than enough in them to put the 
burden of rebuttal back upon those who decline to recognise the claimed rights. 
3.3 A has given a consent such that the benefit of the rights has been waived 
If we treat the claimed rights as being subject to the agent right-holder’s will, then A may 
authorise acts that would otherwise amount to an infringement of her rights; and the standard 
way in which A so authorises such acts is by giving her free and informed consent to those 
acts. 
If A, having a right to know, consents to no return of results, then other things being equal A 
is precluded from complaining that results have not been returned. This is not another way of 
saying that A has the right not to know. By consenting, A changes the requirement of a right 
to know to a permission to withhold, but not to a prohibition on disclosing. The same applies 
mutatis mutandis to A’s right not to know. Hence, if A consents to the return of results, then 
                                                          
25  Compare R (Tracey) v Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and others [2014] 
EWCA Civ 822 (for the application of privacy to a patient’s right to be consulted about a DNACPR 
order). 
 
26  Compare G. Laurie, ‘Privacy and the Right Not to Know: A Plea for Conceptual Clarity’, in Chadwick 
R. et al (n 2) 38. 
 
27  As intriguingly suggested in C. Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475. 
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other things being equal A is precluded from complaining that findings have been returned; 
but, this is not another way of saying that A has the right to know. By consenting, A changes 
the prohibition associated with the right not to know to a permission to return results, but not 
to a requirement to disclose. What, though, is the significance of the ‘other things being 
equal’ caveat?  
First, A’s consent will be valid only if A has the capacity to consent, if the consent is given 
freely and on an informed basis, and if the consent is clearly signalled.28 Each of these 
conditions invites further analysis, always remembering that, because A is authorising an act 
that would otherwise violate her rights, we need to be confident that it is her will to license 
such an act. 
Secondly, in relation to the use of NIPT, there is an understandable concern that, in practice, 
a screening pathway might become quite difficult to avoid. To the extent that the norm is to 
return the primary results of the NIPT, this might be relatively unproblematic. However, if 
the NIPT consent forms state either that no incidental findings will be returned or that all 
findings will be returned, and if asking a patient to sign off on these terms is all very routine, 
the ‘consent’ obtained might be vulnerable to the challenge that it is neither free nor properly 
informed.  
Thirdly, in the context of big biobanks, participants sign up to a set of terms and conditions. 
In principle, a single signature by a participant confirming that the terms and conditions have 
been read and understood and that they are accepted might suffice.29 However, where the 
terms and conditions involve a waiver of the benefits of prior rights—and if the claimed 
                                                          
28  For systematic analysis, see D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Consent in the Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2007). 
 
29  Compare R. Brownsword, ‘Big Biobanks: Three Major Governance Challenges and Some Mini-
Constitutional Solutions’, in D. Stretch and M. Mertz (eds), Ethics in Clinical and Translational 
Research—From Theory to Practice, from Practice to Theory (Springer, 2016) 175. 
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rights are such prior rights—it is imperative that participants are given fair warning of the 
significance of what they are signing up to. Where there is to be no feedback, it is important 
that participants understand that this is not a personal health check; and, where the protocol is 
to return some findings (without any opt out) participants need to be warned that they might 
receive unwelcome health alerts, many of which will prove to be false alarms.  If the format 
of the consent forms is such that, for each right there is a specific and explicit authorisation, 
this might be a more promising design; but, even then, it will not do if prospective 
participants are simply told at enrolment ‘to sign, here, here, and here.’    
3.4 The information in question falls outside the scope of the recognised rights 
In response to A’s claimed rights, it might be argued that the information falls outside the 
scope of the right. For example, B might challenge A’s right to know about the health status 
of her baby on the ground that this is information about ‘another’, not about A herself. In 
support, B might point to Attorney General’s Reference No 3 of 199430 where the House of 
Lords rejected the Court of Appeal’s view that the fetus should be ‘viewed as an integral part 
of the mother’31; but A might counter with the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights according to which a human fetus is not to yet to be treated as a direct holder 
of rights.32 Given such inconclusive legal signals, a possible response for A is along the lines 
that, even if the baby is not integral to the mother, so long as the mother is recognised as 
having a right to terminate her pregnancy, it would be incongruous to deny her access to 
information that is relevant to that decision. Alternatively, A might try to reframe the right as 
one that centres, not on information that is ‘about her’, but as information the disclosure or 
                                                          
30  [1996] QB 581 (CA); [1997] 3 All ER 936 (HL). 
 
31  [1996] QB 581, 598. 
 
32  See, Vo v France (Application no. 53924/00) (Grand Chamber, July 8, 2004); Evans v United Kingdom 
(Application no. 6339/05) (Grand Chamber, April 10, 2007). 
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non-disclosure of which clearly touches and concerns her physical or psychological well-
being. If this latter approach is accepted, it succeeds in by-passing the difficult question of 
whether the baby should be treated as integral to the mother.33 
B might also question the scope of A’s right to know where the information in question is of 
such uncertain significance that A could not act upon it. Recognising the potential uncertainty 
of genetic information, the different degrees of seriousness of findings, and different grades 
of actionability, we might place findings on one of three lists: (1) a ‘white list’ (results should 
be returned), (2) a ‘grey list’ (results may be returned), and (3) a ‘black list’ (results should 
not be returned).34 But, then, even if the information clearly relates to a serious condition and 
is treatable (as per the ‘easy rescue’ scenario), a proviso for lawful use seems appropriate. For 
example, what if screeners suspect that the mother plans to use her NIPT results in order to 
determine the sex of the baby with a view to engaging in unlawful sex selection?35 If it were 
known that the mother was using NIPT in order to prepare for an unlawful termination, and 
even though the two certifying doctors are the immediate gatekeepers of lawful terminations, 
there would be good reasons to withhold the information. On the other hand, if there were 
merely a suspicion of, or a possibility of, the woman having an unlawful intention, this would 
be more problematic—after all, there will be many women who simply want to know (but not 
act on knowing) the sex of their baby.36 For present purposes, it suffices to say that, as a 
general principle, results should not be returned where this would constitute an act of 
                                                          
33  See, further, R. Brownsword and J. Wale, ‘The Development of Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Some 
Legal and Ethical Questions’ (2016) 24 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 24 (forthcoming). 
 
34  Compare S.M. Wolf, et al, ‘Managing incidental findings and research results in genomic research 
involving biobanks and archived data sets’ (2012) 14 Genetics in Medicine 361. 
 
35  See, further, J. Wale, ‘Don’t Forget the Legal Framework: the Public Provision of Non-Invasive 
Prenatal Testing in England and Wales’ (2016) 16 Medical Law International (DOI: 
10.1177/0968533216646154); and R. Brownsword and J. Wale (n 33). 
 
36  See, Z. Deans, A.J. Clarke, and A.J. Newson, ‘For your interest? The ethical acceptability of using non-
invasive prenatal testing to test “purely for information”’ (2015) 29 Bioethics 19. 
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assistance with what is known to be a prospectively unlawful act—the most pressing example 
of which is unlawful sex selection.37 
3.5 A’s right is overridden by a higher order right (or by a compelling consideration of the 
‘public interest’) 
In principle, A’s right to know or not to know may be overridden by a higher ranking 
conflicting right or by some compelling consideration of the public interest. Given the 
different ways in which A might try to ground and characterise these rights, their ranking 
rather depends on which account is accepted as the most coherent. On their strongest 
interpretation, A’s claimed rights relate to an agent’s fundamental interest in identity or in 
their physical and psychological well-being; even on a less high-ranking interpretation, the 
rights are characterised as protecting A’s proprietary or personality interests. As such, these 
are rights that protect either vital or serious agency interests and they will not be easily 
outranked by conflicting rights. Similarly, with such high-ranking rights at stake, a public 
interest justification will have to be related to some kind of emergency and not merely an all 
things considered but routine balancing of interests. A’s rights ‘trump’ routine justifications 
and, if public interest arguments are to operate, so to speak as ‘super-trumps’, they need to be 
something exceptional.   
Biobank governance offers some exemplars for the tension between participants’ rights and 
public interest considerations, one of which arises where access is sought for reasons that are 
not explicitly authorised by participants in their consents but where this would serve the 
public interest—for example, in order to assist with the investigation of a serious crime or in 
                                                          
37  See, A. Hall, A. Bostanci, and S. John, Ethical, legal and social issues arising from cell-free fetal DNA 
technologies (PHG Foundation, 2009); (available at: 
http://www.phgfoundation.org/download/ffdna/ffDNA_appendix.pdf. ).  
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order to help with the identification of victims following a major incident or disaster.38 In 
fact, in both these examples, the ‘public interest’ might be decomposed into a number of 
‘rights’ that would be served by granting access (in the latter case, interestingly, pleading a 
family’s ‘right to know’ about the fate of a loved one), in which case the question assumes 
the form of making a choice between conflicting rights. Without such a decomposition of the 
claim, at a time when the public interest is being pitched against individuals being able to 
assert rights that retard public health projects, there is a debate to be had about the 
relationship between the rights paradigm and public interest justifications—but this is not the 
place to have it.39 
4. After Montgomery 
In recent years, there have been some important developments in the UK’s medical law 
jurisprudence.40 Amongst these developments, the decision of the UK Supreme Court in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board stands out as a potential ‘landmark’.41 Potentially, 
this is not just a leading case that materially reduces the range and relevance of the so-called 
Bolam test,42 it instates a radically new approach to the relationship between doctors and 
patients that might one day shape judicial thinking on the relationship between researchers 
                                                          
38  For discussion, see R. Brownsword (n 29); and, for some acute remarks on the tension in such 
scenarios, see For an extremely helpful survey, see J.R. Reidenberg, R. Gellman, J. Debelak, A. Elewa, 
and N. Liu, Privacy and Missing Persons After Natural Disasters (Washington DC and New York, 
NY: Center on Law and Information Policy at Fordham Law School and Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 2013). 
 
39  See, further, R. Brownsword, ‘Rights, Responsibility and Stewardship: Beyond Consent’, in H. 
Widdows and C. Mullen (eds), The Governance of Genetic Information: Who Decides? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 99. 
 
40  For consideration of some of these case-law developments, including Aintree University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 
68, and Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, see R. Brownsword, ‘Axiological 
Pluralism: Conflict in the Hospital, Resolution in the Courts’ (forthcoming). 
 
41  Compare R. Heywood, ‘R.I.P. Sidaway: Patient-Orientated Disclosure—A Standard Worth Waiting 
For?’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 455. 
 
42  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. See 4.1 below. 
19 
 
and participants (even though this relationship was not directly at issue in Montgomery). 
After sketching the ‘new approach’ in Montgomery, we can assess its significance for the 
claimed rights. 
4.1 Montgomery: the New Approach 
The principal question in Montgomery was whether a pregnant woman who was a diabetic, 
and whose pregnancy was regarded as high-risk requiring intensive monitoring, should have 
been informed that there was a risk of shoulder dystocia and given the option of delivery by 
Caesarean Section. Instead, she was not made aware of this particular risk; the risk 
eventuated during an attempted vaginal delivery; and, as a result, the baby was born with 
severe disabilities. The lower courts, following the Bolam principle, held that the acts of the 
consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist who did not disclose the risk, and who was by her 
own admission reluctant to steer women towards a Caesarean Section, was sufficiently 
supported by medical practice. However, the UK Supreme Court, resoundingly rejecting the 
applicability of the Bolam test to such matters of patient information and physician 
disclosure, held that the relationship between clinicians and patients must be rights-respecting 
rather than paternalistic and that patients have a right to be informed about their options 
(together with their relative benefits and risks). 
In a few paragraphs, the Supreme Court rewrote the legal framework governing the 
relationship between physicians and patients. First, the Court recognised that ‘patients are 
now widely regarded as persons holding rights, rather than as the passive recipients of the 
care of the medical profession’.43 Secondly, the Court noted that patients, while not medical 
experts, are not wholly uninformed. Accordingly, it would be ‘a mistake to view patients as 
uninformed, incapable of understanding medical matters, or wholly dependent upon a flow of 
                                                          
43  [2015] UKSC 11, para 75. 
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information from doctors’, from which it followed that it would now be ‘manifestly 
untenable’ to make this ‘the default assumption on which the law is to be based’.44 Thirdly, 
professional guidance to doctors already reflects these changes by encouraging ‘an approach 
based upon the informed involvement of patients in their treatment’.45 Signalling a distinct 
movement away from medical paternalism and patient-dependence, the new approach is built 
on mutual rights and responsibilities, treating patients ‘so far as possible as adults who are 
capable of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of success and may involve 
risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with 
the consequences of their choices’.46 That said, Montgomery recognises that, in exceptional 
circumstances, doctors may legitimately withhold information under cover of the so-called 
‘therapeutic privilege’. However, the Court emphasises that this exception ‘is not intended to 
subvert [the general principle] by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making an 
informed choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor considers to be 
contrary to her best interests’.47 In short, patients have a right to make their own judgments, 
prudential and moral, of what is in their best interests;48 and it is the responsibility of doctors 
not to override these judgments but to assist patients by ensuring that their choices are 
suitably informed.   
While each case must be judged on its own particular facts, there is no suggestion that 
Montogmery is an exceptional decision with little precedent value. Nevertheless, even if 
                                                          
44  [2015] UKSC 11, para 76. 
 
45  [2015] UKSC 11, para 78. 
 
46  [2015] UKSC 11, para 81. 
 
47  [2015] UKSC 11, para 91. 
 
48  Nb Lady Hale in Montgomery at para 115. 
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Montgomery is the landmark decision that it seems to be, the extent to which it supports the 
claimed rights is open to interpretation. 
4.2 Montgomery and the right to know  
After Montgomery, we can take it that, at all stages of a pregnancy, whether in the ante-natal 
screening clinic or in the delivery room, a woman has a right to be informed about the options 
that are available to her. It follows that, once NIPT is embedded in the screening pathway, 
pregnant women will have a right to know about the availability of the test, to be informed 
about the risks and consequences of having the test, and following the test to be informed 
about the results and the further options. As we have said, however, it seems unlikely that 
there will be any opposition to this articulation of the right to know (in relation to the primary 
results); and, the fact that Montgomery supports this incarnation of the right is probably not 
significant. The real question is whether Montgomery supports a more extended application 
of the right to know. 
Suppose, for example, the test used by NHS screeners might also reveal a potentially life-
threatening condition that affects the mother. While Montgomery might be thought to assist 
the mother’s claimed right to know, the decision of the High Court in ABC v St George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust49will give us pause. There, the claimant, who was pregnant at the 
relevant time, brought an action in negligence against the defendants, complaining that they 
had failed to inform her that her father had been diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease. Had 
the claimant been so informed, she would have known that she was at risk of having the 
disease and, knowing that her children would also be at risk, she would have terminated the 
pregnancy. In response, the defendants advanced a catalogue of reasons why it would not be 
fair, just, and reasonable to impose the duty. In one way or another, these reasons all hinged 
                                                          
49  [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB). 
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on the fact that the defendants obtained the information about the father’s health status in 
confidence. To tell the claimant daughter that her father had Huntington’s Disease would be 
to break the confidence; and English law sets the bar very high before a confidence may be 
broken—indeed, higher than that set by bodies such as the Human Genetics Commission, the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the GMC (where the importance of alerting family 
members to genetic risks is recognised).  
Faced with this barrage of arguments favouring respecting the confidence, coupled with the 
absence of a clear precedent in support of the claimant’s case, Mr Justice Nicol agreed that 
the claim should be struck out. In the circumstances, the judge held that it manifestly would 
not be fair, just, and reasonable to impose on the defendants a duty to inform the daughter. 
However, it is not clear whether the court (i) declined to recognise a prima facie duty to 
inform or (ii) recognised a (weak) prima facie duty to inform but treated it as outweighed by 
a (stronger) conflicting duty of confidence. While, from the claimant’s perspective, it matters 
little whether the court reasoned in the first or the second way, in relation to our screening 
hypothetical (where there is no issue of confidentiality) it would matter quite a lot if the court 
rejected any such prima facie duty.50  
Changing the hypothetical, suppose that the test used by NHS screeners reveals information 
about the fetus other than that relating to the trisomies. If the screeners decline to disclose 
such additional findings, it would be a stretch to suggest that Montgomery supports a claimed 
right to know. That said, the Supreme Court remarked that ‘the courts have become 
increasingly conscious of the extent to which the common law reflects fundamental values’51; 
or, to put this more prescriptively, the courts have increasingly realised the importance of the 
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51  [2015] UKSC 11, para 80. 
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common law being in line with fundamental values. Taking such a cue, a court might in 
future start with the proposition that, if a woman wishes to access information about the 
genetic profile of her baby, she has a fundamental right to do so. This would suggest that the 
health service has a responsibility to return to the woman whatever test results are (i) 
relatively easy to interpret, (ii) clear as to their clinical significance, and (iii) material to the 
woman’s decision—the Montgomery test of materiality being ‘whether, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient would be likely to attach significance to it’.52 Presumably, no reasonable person 
would want information on what I earlier termed the ‘black list’; but, what would be the legal 
position if a particular woman (unreasonably) did want all results, on all lists, returned? If the 
scope of a right to be informed follows closely the contours of the Montgomery case, it might 
well be that it extends only to results on the ‘white list’.53 However, if the reference point for 
a right to be informed is not restricted by Montgomery, it might be that it extends to the grey 
list or even to the full spectrum of results including data on the black list.    
Having discussed at some length the significance of Montgomery relative to the right to know 
in the context of screening and reproductive decisions, what application, if any, does it have 
to biobanking? Some will give this question short shrift: Montgomery, it will be said, has no 
such application; the facts of Montgomery raised a question about clinical options, and even 
the more general principles—the new approach—concern the relationship between doctors 
and patients. Questions arising in a research context are simply not on the radar. 
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53  As Heywood (n 41) points out, there is a considerable emphasis in Montgomery on the information 
being given in a from that is understandable and with a view to aiding the patient’s understanding. 
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From a narrow legal perspective, this assessment seems correct. If Montgomery were to be 
cited in a claim made against a biobank or a biobank researcher, it would be easy to 
distinguish it; and even if the line between what is clinical and what is research is a bit hazy, 
it serves to confine the application of the new approach. Nevertheless, this surely plays down 
the significance of the Supreme Court’s recognition of persons such as patients having rights; 
participants in research trials or studies, too, would be seen as having rights. It does not 
follow, of course, that they have a right to know. However, to repeat a point already made, 
where the information over which a participant claims to have a right to know is potentially 
life-saving, it seems an abdication of the researchers’ responsibilities if they can decline to 
return findings because it might involve a minor inconvenience or a slight disruption to the 
research project. Indeed, if the courts are already aware of the importance of the common law 
aligning with fundamental values, and if one of our fundamental values is that we should 
assist others in need, then even before Montgomery one might think that a claim of this kind 
should succeed.54 
4.3 Montgomery and the right not to know 
In Montgomery, we read that ‘[a] person can of course decide that she does not wish to be 
informed of risks of injury (just as a person may choose to ignore the information leaflet 
enclosed with her medicine).’55 This might be read as saying no more than that a person who 
has the right to know may elect not to inform themselves; and, given that Montgomery is 
concerned with providing rather than not providing information, this might be all that the 
Court means. Accordingly, we need to be careful not to make too much of Montgomery in 
relation to the claimed right not to know. 
                                                          
54  On the responsibility to assist, see R. Brownsword, ‘The Ancillary Care Responsibilities of 
Researchers: Reasonable but Not Great Expectations’ (2007) 35 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 
679. 
 
55  [2015] UKSC 11, para 85. 
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In the context of screening and the use of NIPT, we do not know how far Montgomery might 
support the right to know; however, we do know that the right to know is only likely to be a 
real issue where the practice is not to return findings that pregnant women wish to have. 
Similarly, although Montgomery is hard to interpret on the right not to know, we do know 
that the right not to know is only likely to become a real issue where the practice is to return 
findings. Provided that the options that are available are set out and a woman then rejects an 
option for the return of findings, the thinking in Montgomery suggests that, on the one side, 
health care professionals must restrain any paternalistic impulses that they might have, and, 
on the other, the woman must live with the consequences of her decision. 
Yet, it might not be quite so easy to turn back the tide of genetic information. For example, 
the costs and inconvenience of administering a right not to know might not be trivial; 
professionals might find it difficult to accept that they should act as though patients know 
best when in their expert judgment they manifestly do not; and, for all we know, the culture 
of reproduction in future communities might be so risk-averse that the general view is that 
parents should not be permitted to shirk their responsibilities by claiming a right not to 
know.56  
Much the same applies to the right not to know in the context of biobanking, where the 
application of Montgomery is even less clear. Here, again, a participant’s (or a prospective 
participant’s) claimed right not to know is only likely to present a real issue when the practice 
at biobanks shifts from no feedback to feedback, or where the volume and nature of findings 
that are returned changes. For example, while UK Biobank is now undertaking a major 
                                                          
56  Compare H.T. Greely, The End of Sex and the Future of Human Reproduction (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2016). See, too, Heywood (n 41) who says at 465: 
 
Depending upon how the decision in Montgomery is explained to health-care providers, and how it 
subsequently comes to be understood, it is not beyond the realms of possibility to envisage a scenario 
in which health-care professionals are prone to disclose what might best be described as excessive 
information, which some patients may not necessarily need or, worse still, want. 
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imaging sub-study that retains the general rule of ‘no feedback’ in relation to research 
findings, there is a procedure for returning potentially significant clinical findings arising 
(incidentally) from the taking of the scans and images.57 The participant information outlines 
this procedure in the following terms: 
The technicians conducting the scans will be looking at the images to ensure their 
quality. It is important to understand that they will not be looking at them to identify 
particular health problems. However, if a technician does notice something unusual 
that they think might be serious they will refer that scan to a specialist doctor for 
review. Something would be considered potentially serious if it indicated the 
possibility of a condition which, if confirmed, would carry a real prospect of seriously 
threatening life span, or of having a substantial impact on major body functions or 
quality of life. If the specialist doctor agrees that the abnormality may be serious 
(regardless of whether or not it can be treated), then we will write to you and your GP 
(usually within two weeks of your visit).58 
Crucially, those who agree to participate in the imaging study are not given the option of 
opting out. Accordingly, the information sheet emphasises that a prospective participant 
should only agree to participate ‘if you feel able to consent to both you and your GP being 
informed if a potentially serious abnormality is noticed on one of your scans.’59 For those 
who are concerned about the prospect of being presented with unwelcome information, 
possibly raising anxiety unnecessarily, and possibly of uncertain significance, the advice is to 
think very hard before agreeing to participate.60 Unless we think that we should have (i) a 
                                                          
57  See http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ (last accessed September 25, 2016). 
 
58  Information leaflet at p. 12: accessed via http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/. 
 
59  Information leaflet, at p. 13: accessed via http://imaging.ukbiobank.ac.uk/. 
 
60  Ibid. 
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right to participate in biobank projects, coupled with (ii) a right to opt-out from the return of 
findings, declining to participate is an effective and an acceptable way of protecting oneself 
against the genetic tides. However, this is far from ideal and, if this happens on a large scale, 
biobanks might follow the Estonian model and grant a right to opt out from the return of 
findings. In any event, Montgomery probably offers little assistance to those who wish to 
assist researchers but without having to cope with genetic information that they prefer not to 
have. Accordingly, if the question is whether we should recognise a right to participate 
together with a right to opt out from the return of findings, then Montgomery is probably not 
where we will find the answer. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
As genetic tests become even cheaper and as the interpretation of results becomes more 
reliable and actionable, it seems likely that some humans will want to know the results of 
such tests and others will not. Whether or not humans will be entitled to insist on knowing or 
not knowing, remains to be seen; much will turn on whether a right to know and a right not to 
know is recognised. We can be confident, I suggest, that we have not heard the last of these 
rights. Accordingly, let me conclude with three short general remarks.  
First, the claimed right to know seems particularly compelling where it relates to information 
that is personal (being ‘about me’) rather than being about others or other things. Arguably, 
however, there is also an important distinction between claiming the rights in order to define 
or maintain one’s personality (or sense of identity) and claiming the rights in relation to 
personal information for other purposes. It is in the former that we find a common basis for 
(but not necessarily symmetrical articulation of) these rights. That said, these short thoughts 
raise questions about both the basis of the claimed rights and their relationship with one 
another that invite further analysis. 
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Secondly, as genetic information becomes more widely distributed, accessible and 
interpretable, the default in health care will be for each person to be aware of their genetic 
profile such that those who need to assert a right to know will be pushing at an open door; 
but, at the same time, for those who prefer to lead their lives without having to assess and 
micro-manage their particular genetic risks, the right not to know will be their protective 
shield. In the longer run, therefore, it is the basis, strength and scope of the right not to know 
that needs to be most clearly articulated.61  
Thirdly, while the decision in Montgomery is open to interpretation62, perhaps its enduring 
significance is not so much that there is a right to be informed about one’s treatment options 
but simply that patients have rights.63 With this support from Montgomery it becomes clear 
that the regulatory environment for healthcare, including screening and biobanking, has to 
protect, preserve and promote the rights of patients and participants. To what extent that 
environment should respect the claimed right to know and not to know is a matter for 
continuing debate; but this is now a debate for a community that is committed to rights, not 
for a community that is inclined to default to physician paternalism, professional duties, 
risk/benefit calculations, or the general utility.64 
 
                                                          
61  Compare R. C. Green et al, ‘ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical 
Exome and Genome Sequencing’ available at http://www.acmg.net/docs/ACMG_Releases_Highly-
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risk information’. 
 
62  For an important review of the facts, see J. Montgomery and E. Montgomery, ‘Montgomery on 
informed consent: an inexpert decision?’ (2016) 42 J Med Ethics 89.  
63  See Heywood (n 41) at 462-464. 
 
64  For helpful reflections on the values that shape EU governance of public health, see Mark Flear, 
Governing Public Health (Oxford: Hart, 2015). 
